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one hand information may lead to emotional costs, on the other the higher the information
accuracy, the higher the eﬃciency of decision-making.
We completely and explicitly characterize how anticipatory utility depends on information
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1. Introduction
Patients may be aware that they are at risk of high cholesterol or high blood pressure and that
these health conditions can have serious consequences in the future. However, since perfect
knowledge can lead to anxiety, full resolution of uncertainty may not be the best choice. In-
vestors may fear their portfolio choices are not appropriate, and this could imply bad financial
consequences in future periods. Taking into account the emotional eﬀects of information ac-
quisition, the optimal amount of information investors should acquire is not obvious. People
may suspect their partner is having an aﬀair. If the suspicion turns out to be founded, their
future will be seriously compromised. The famous saying ‘What you don’t know won’t hurt you’
illustrates that full information learning is not always the preferred choice.
In standard decision theory, if information has decision-making value it is welfare improving,
if it does not, it simply becomes irrelevant. However, this usual conjecture that more (free)
information is preferred to less might not be valid when decision-makers’ well-being also depends
on anticipatory feelings. In the motivating examples above, decision-makers (DMs henceforth)
face a risk that leads to physical negative consequences in the future and, in the present, can bring
about anticipatory feelings as fear or discomfort. Whenever DMs fear bad outcomes, information
makes discomfort rise such that anomalous attitudes towards information acquisition can occur
in the form of complete or partial information avoidance behavior. This is true also when
information has a decision-making value, as in the examples above, and as is widely documented
in the case of health behavior. For example, according to medical evidence, in many situations
patients avoid free information that could be used to take better decisions (see Jacobsen et al.
1997, Lerman et al. 1994 and 1998, Quaid and Morris 1993).1
The aim of this work is to investigate information gathering by emotional DMs. To do so
we use a simple version of the Psychological Expected Utility (PEU) model proposed by Caplin
and Leahy (2001). In the PEU model anticipatory utility is modeled as utility derived from the
DMs’ expectations concerning their future such that the DMs’ well-being is not only defined
over physical outcomes as in standard analysis, but also over beliefs about physical outcomes.
What is crucial for our purpose is attitude towards information: in the PEU model DMs can
1For example, Lerman et al. (1998) demonstrated that 46% of subjects whose blood was tested for genetic
mutations refused to receive the test results despite the fact that the test results indicated whether or not these
subjects were susceptible to breast cancer later in life. By knowing more precise information on their risk of
cancer patients would have been able to take better prevention measures.
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be averse or not to information. When they are information-averse they suﬀer if information is
disclosed. In other words, information-averse DMs dislike bad news more than they like good
news.
In our setting, if the DM remains ignorant he pays the cost of selecting an ineﬃcient action.
In fact, physical utility depends both on the state of nature and on a specific action that, in order
to be most eﬀective, has to be state-contingent. In addition, since the DM derives utility directly
from his beliefs, he must also consider how the information he gathers will aﬀect those beliefs.
In the model the DM chooses the amount of information by selecting the accuracy of a signal.
Thus, any level of information acquisition is admissible: the DM can decide to remain completely
ignorant or, by searching for information from diﬀerent sources, he can choose diﬀerent amounts
of information up to full information.2
By considering the possibility of searching for information characterized by diﬀerent content
precision, we address in details the trade-oﬀ between the physical benefits and emotional costs
of information for DMs who are information-averse. We completely and explicitly characterize
how anticipatory utility depends on information accuracy, and study the optimal amount of
information acquisition. As it will be further specified below, our results complement and extend
previous ones showing that anomalous attitudes towards information can be more frequent
and more articulated than previously thought. Moreover, since our simple and transparent
framework yields explicit solutions for the conditions under which anomalous attitudes towards
information occur, it can be a useful tool for analyzing and interpreting decision-making and
strategic interaction in those contexts where anticipatory feelings are relevant.
More in details, we show that anticipatory utility can be non-monotone in information ac-
curacy. Depending on the interplay between the degree of the DM’s information aversion and
the level of uncertainty (which aﬀects the cost of an ineﬃcient action) the DM can prefer no
information, partial information or full information acquisition.
To understand the interaction between information aversion and the level of uncertainty
it is useful to notice that information aversion (implying concavity of the anticipatory utility
2For example, patients could consider some partially informative facts such as their family medical history, or
they could look for some information concerning the probability of being high-risk conditional on their specific
lifestyle. Whereas a medical test would correspond to a perfect signal. Investors could read financial newspapers
to obtain information on financial market performance. Consulting their financial expert, instead, would be
equivalent to solve all the uncertainty on their portfolio return. Distrustful partners could look for circumstantial
evidence such as ambiguous messages on mobile phones. Otherwise, by employing a personal investigator to spy
on their partner their could obtain irrefutable evidence.
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function) always induces discomfort for information acquisition when no action is available.
Thus, discomfort from information systematically induces the DM not to acquire any information
when information has no decision-making value. On the other hand, better actions may oﬀset
the eﬀect of a bad signal on beliefs so that the DM ends up with an ex-post payoﬀ higher
than when he remains ignorant (in such a case no emotional costs from information arise even
though the DM is information averse). When instead unfavorable updated beliefs due to bad
news have a stronger impact than better choices, the DM ends up with an ex-post payoﬀ lower
than when he stays ignorant. From an ex-ante view point, in the latter case the anticipatory
utility associated with information acquisition is lower than the payoﬀ of remaining ignorant and
the DM experiments discomfort from information even though information has decision-making
value.
For anomalous behavior regarding information acquisition (i.e. full or partial avoidance) it is
necessary that the DM indeed faces some discomfort from information. In such a case the trade-
oﬀ between emotional costs and physical benefits of information arises. The way in which such
trade-oﬀ is solved precisely depends on the interplay between the degree of information aversion
and the level of uncertainty. For example, when information aversion is low and the cost of an
ineﬃcient action is high, anticipatory utility is monotonically increasing in information accuracy.
However, if both information aversion and the cost of an ineﬃcient action are low, then two cases
can occur: either anticipatory utility is monotonically increasing in information accuracy or it
exhibits a maximum for partial information. The latter case arises only if information aversion
is low, but not too much (otherwise full information is clearly optimal) and is due to the fact
that since uncertainty is small, by choosing imprecise signals the DM can perfectly tune the
physical benefits and the emotional costs of information leading to an interior optimum (no
corner solutions). In all the other situations, even though anticipatory utility can be non-
monotone in information accuracy, either full information or full ignorance are the preferred
choices.
Our work is closely related to and borrows from Kozsegi (2003) who uses a simple version
of the PEU model to explain why, as documented by the medical evidence mentioned before,
patients sometimes avoid free information on their health status. As in our model, in Kozsegi
ignorance is costly in terms of ineﬃcient actions and the DM is information-averse. A first
result shows that, when available information is perfect (i.e. the DM decides to be either fully
ignorant or fully informed), full information is always preferred to full ignorance if uncertainty is
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limited enough. Then, in a second result Kozsegi introduces the possibility of partial information
acquisition (i.e. non fully-informative signals are also available) and illustrates preferences such
that anticipatory utility is monotone in information accuracy: the patient either wants full
information or remains completely ignorant since partial information is always dominated.
By fully characterizing anticipatory utility we extend and complement Kozsegi’s results. In
our model, even if uncertainty is limited (as in Kozsegi’s first result), still an anomalous behav-
ior can emerge. When information aversion is low (but not too much), the non-monotonicity
of anticipatory utility implies that, with small uncertainty, (i) full-ignorance can dominate full-
information; (ii) although full-information can dominate full-ignorance, partial information dom-
inates full-information. By showing that partial information accuracy can indeed maximize an-
ticipatory utility in some cases, our paper indicates that the PEU model provides an appropriate
framework that delivers a complete picture of anomalous attitudes towards information.3
From a policy perspective our results show that the disclosure of partial information can
be beneficial to anxious DMs. A similar conclusion is reached in two other papers investigat-
ing very diﬀerent set-ups. First, Caplin and Eliaz (2003, page 633) concerning the AIDS test
write: “There are strong health-based incentives to test for AIDS, but fear may override these
incentives. Our resolution of the problem is to decrease the informativeness of a bad test result,
mitigating the fear of bad news, and thereby allowing the health-based incentives to reassert
their primacy”. Second, Yariv (2005) constructs a multi-period choice model to investigate Cog-
nitive Consistency, that is individuals’ natural inclination to interpret new evidence in ways that
confirm their pre-existing beliefs. Given the specific aim of his analysis, Yariv assumes that in
each period the DM receives a signal and then directly chooses his belief (instead of updating
it). An incorrect belief may be advantageous because it is a ‘desirable’ belief and thus increases
anticipatory utility. However the DM is constrained to choose an action which is optimal w.r.t.
his belief, such that holding an incorrect belief is costly in terms of physical utility. As a result of
such trade-oﬀ, the author finds that agents may sometimes prefer less accurate signals to more
3Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) is also related to our analysis. These authors investigate a general model where
the DM’s beliefs enter utility (the model of Expected Utility from Beliefs). With such a model they analyze the
DM’s attitude towards information and information sources. In particular, the authors aim to verify whether the
model of Expected Utility from Beliefs is able to explain those situations where the attitude towards information
is aﬀected by the DMs’ priors (for example, the case of a patient preferring more accurate medical tests when he
is relatively certain of being healthy, yet avoiding such tests when he is relatively certain of being ill). The main
diﬀerence between Eliaz and Spiegler’s and C-L’s approach is that the latter examine the DM’s behavior for a
fixed prior while Eliaz and Spiegler account for attitudes to information that vary with the DM’s prior.
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accurate ones.4
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model set-up. In Section 3
we discuss the DM’s decision process and derive anticipatory utility as a function of informa-
tion accuracy. In section 4, we show conditions such that the emotional cost of information is
positive, we characterize anticipatory utility and discuss anomalous attitudes towards informa-
tion. Section 5 concludes. The appendix completes our analysis and provides some numerical
simulations.
2. The model
Following the methodology of Caplin and Leahy (2001, 2004), the DM’s utility is a function of
physical outcomes and belief-based emotions, with anticipatory emotions responding to informa-
tion. There are two periods, 1 and 2, and total utility is the sum of future utility from physical
outcomes, and current anticipatory emotions, which depend on rationally formed beliefs about
the exact same outcomes.5
The DM’s physical utility in period 2 is h(wi, a), where wi = {w1, w2} is the physical outcome
realized in period 1, with wi ∈ <, and a is an action. Importantly and as in the case of the
motivating examples before, even if the physical outcome is realized in period 1, wi has physical
eﬀects only in period 2. In the same way the action a ∈ < is taken in period 1 but it only aﬀects
utility in period 2.6
We assume that w1 is the preferred outcome such that w1 > w2. Moreover, each outcome has
4The issue of information gathering by emotional DMs is also related to the recent literature on Selective
Attention. This literature develops the idea that individuals consciously decide what information to expose
themselves to and what information to avoid. In particular, while people search selectively for information that
conveys good news or that reinforces their pre-existing beliefs, they avoid information that conveys bad news or
conflicts with prior beliefs. The idea of self-manipulation of beliefs to increase one’s utility is particularly natural
in the field of finance: recently Karlsson, Loewenstain and Seppi (2005) analyzed investors’ selective exposure to
information on financial markets in a model where individuals condition their information learning decisions on
imperfect prior information that can be positive or negative. They show that investors who observed (imperfect)
bad news exhibit the so-called ‘ostrich eﬀect’.
5This represents a simple version of the PEU model described in C-L (2001). In our model, as in C-L (2004)
and in K, the DM experiences only emotional utility in the first period and not both emotional and physical utility
as in the seminal model.
6 In our motivating examples the patient’s action is represented by all preventative behavior adopted or treat-
ment undertaken, whereas in the case of the investor, the action can be interpreted as every possible change in
his portfolio composition. The action for the suspicious partner could be the appropriate attitude to take with
his/her partner.
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the same probability pi, i = 1, 2 of occurring, p1 = p2 = 1/2, and the DM’s priors are correct.
By observing a signal the DM obtains information on the outcome realized. A signal is a
random variable which can take two values, s1 and s2. A signal is characterized by a pair of
conditional probabilities (q1, q2), where qi ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¤
, i = 1, 2, is the probability of observing the
realization si conditional on the outcome being wi : qi =prob(si|wi). For the sake of tractability
we also assume that q1 = q2 = q, that is, the signal is symmetric.
Since in the first period the DM derives utility from the anticipation of period-2 physical
outcome, anticipatory utility depends on expected physical utility in period 2 conditional on the
DM’s beliefs in period 1. In turn, the DM’s beliefs depend on the signal observed:
emotional utility = u (E [h (w, a)| si]) (2.1)
The function u(·) is increasing in the expectation of physical utility E [h (w, a)]. The shape of
u(·) determines the DM’s preferences for information. When u(·) is concave, the DM is averse
to information and he dislikes bad news more than he likes good news. If u(·) is convex, on the
contrary, the DM is ‘information-loving’. Finally, when u(·) is linear the DM is ‘information-
neutral’.
Utility in period 2 corresponds to physical utility h (wi, a) . To calculate the total DM utility
from the perspective of period 1, we add to emotional utility (2.1) the expectation of period-2
physical utility: E [h (w, a)| si].
As is shown in appendix 6.5, by considering total utility we obtain results that are qualita-
tively equivalent to those we obtain by restricting ourselves to emotional utility. For this reason,
in the rest of the paper we focus on anticipatory utility (2.1).7
Let’s assume that physical utility is h(wi, a) = wi − (wi − a)2 . Thus, given the outcome
wi, wi also corresponds to the maximum level of physical utility that can be achieved if the
appropriate action (a = wi) is chosen. If the taken action a is not appropriate, the DM will be
worse oﬀ: the loss function (wi − a)2 measures the damage resulting from inaccurate actions.
The DM chooses the precision of the signal q. The decision to become completely informed
is equivalent to the choice of q = 1, the fully informative signal, whereas the decision to remain
ignorant is equivalent to the choice of q = 12 , the uninformative signal. The decision to become
partially informed corresponds to the choice of an intermediate value for q.
7This approach is also used in K, so that our results will be directly comparable with those of K.
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The DM’s choice of the precision of the signals, given the prior p = 1/2, is rational. When
choosing q, the DM anticipates both that he will update his beliefs upon observing the sig-
nal’s realization and that he will choose the action a according to such beliefs. Information is
completely costless.
To summarize, the DM maximizes his emotional utility (2.1). First he chooses the signal
precision q and observes the realization of the signal, then he updates his priors according to
Bayes’ rule, and finally he chooses the optimal action a given updated beliefs. All the actions
take place in period 1.
We assume that the function u(·) is concave. In fact, as will be clear in Section 4, no
interesting trade-oﬀ exists between the physical benefits and emotional costs of information for
DMs who are not information-averse.
Let’s calculate posterior beliefs in our simple model. Given priors p = 12 and conditional
probabilities q = prob(si|wi), i = 1, 2, the probabilities of the two signals and posterior beliefs
are indicated in the following table:
si prob(si) prob(w1|si)
s1 1/2 q
s2 1/2 1− q
(Table 1: posterior beliefs.)
We call zi the posterior probability of the preferred outcome w1, given that the signal si
has been observed: zi ≡prob(w1|si). Note that, in this simple setting, conditional probability q
corresponds to the updated belief that the true state is w1, given the signal s1. In other words,
in our model by choosing the precision of the signal q, the DM directly chooses the posterior
belief associated with each signal.
3. The DM’s problem
We solve the DM’s problem by backward induction.
• Choice of a. At the end of period 1 the DM updates his beliefs and chooses the action
a given the signal observed. The optimal action is:
a∗i (q;w1, w2|si) = argmaxa u
³
E
h
w − (w − a)2 |si
i´
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Note that if the signal is fully or partially informative, two diﬀerent optimal actions exist,
whereas if the signal is uninformative, the two optimal actions are the same: a∗i
¡
1
2 ;w1, w2|si
¢
= a∗
¡
1
2 ;w1, w2
¢
.
• Choice of q. At the beginning of period 1 the DM chooses the precision of the signal by
maximizing anticipatory utility:
U(q;w1, w2) =
1
2
u
³
E
h
w − (w − a∗1 (q;w1, w2|s1))2 |s1
i´
+ (3.1)
1
2
u
³
E
h
w − (w − a∗2 (q;w1, w2|s2))2 |s2
i´
The previous expression represents anticipatory utility from an ex-ante perspective: when
choosing information accuracy, the DM anticipates that, if the signal si is observed, the
optimal action will be a∗i with expected physical utility E
h
w − (w − a∗i )
2 |si
i
. Thus, each
of the two terms in (3.1) measures anticipatory utility deriving from the observation of
a specific signal. The two terms are weighed by the probability 12 that each signal is
observed.
3.1. Deriving anticipatory utility
Since zi is the posterior probability of the outcome w1 when the signal si has been observed,
expected physical utility becomes:
E
h
w − (w − a)2 |si
i
= zi
h
w1 − (w1 − a)2
i
+ (1− zi)
h
w2 − (w2 − a)2
i
(3.2)
It is easy to verify that, given the signal observed, the optimal action corresponds to the mean
of the two outcomes weighed by the posterior beliefs:
a∗i (q;w1, w2|si) = ziw1 + (1− zi)w2 = Ezi(wi) (3.3)
Since q ≥ 1−q and w1 > w2, from Table 1 it follows that w1 ≥ a∗1 (q;w1, w2|s1) ≥ a∗2 (q;w1, w2|s2)
≥ w2. In fact, signal s1 represents ‘good news’ for the DM because the preferred outcome w1 is
more likely: a∗1 (q;w1, w2|s1) is relatively closer to w1. On the contrary, signal s2 represents ‘bad
news’ for the DM because the preferred outcome w1 is more unlikely: a∗2 (q;w1, w2|s2) is relatively
closer to w2. When the signal is fully informative a∗1 (1;w1, w2|s1) = w1 and a∗2 (1;w1, w2|s2) =
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w2, whereas when the signal is uninformative the unique optimal action is a∗
¡
1
2 ;w1, w2
¢
=
w1 + w2
2
. In general, as the signal becomes more informative, the action a∗i (q;w1, w2|si) becomes
more accurate on average and the DM’s expected physical loss decreases.
By substituting (3.3) in (3.2) and rearranging we find indirect expected physical utility when
signal si is observed:
fi (q;w1, w2) ≡ E
h
w − (w − a∗i (q;w1, w2|si))2 |si
i
= Ezi(wi)− q(1− q)(w1 − w2)2 (3.4)
Note that q(1− q)(w1 − w2)2 represents the expected physical loss due to an inaccurate action
and is decreasing in q. Moreover, indirect expected physical utility fi (q;w1, w2) , i = 1, 2, is
convex in q. By calculating (3.3) and (3.4) for the two signals s1 and s2 and substituting them
in (3.1), we find anticipatory utility as a function of the precision of the signal q:
U(q;w1, w2) =
1
2
u
¡
qw1 + (1− q)w2 − q(1− q)(w1 − w2)2
¢
+ (3.5)
1
2
u
¡
(1− q)w1 + qw2 − q(1− q)(w1 − w2)2
¢
The DM’s problem we analyze is:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
max
q
U(q;w1, w2)
s.t. : q ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¤ (P1)
4. Preferences for information accuracy
Suppose for a moment that physical utility is simply wi and no action has to be taken; no-
information always dominates information learning in this case. In fact, starting from q = 12
and slightly increasing q, the expected outcome conditional on signal s1 (Ez1(w) = qw1 +
(1− q)w1) moves slightly from E(w) ≡ 12w1 +
1
2w2 towards the preferred outcomes w1, whereas
the expected outcome conditional on signal s2 (Ez2(w) = (1− q)w1 + qw2) moves slightly from
E(w) towards the outcome w2. Since the function u(·) is concave, Jensen’s inequality implies
that discomfort from information increases with the distance between the two expected outcomes
Ez1(w) and Ez2(w). When the signal is fully informative, discomfort reaches its maximum since,
in that case, Ez1(w) = w1 and Ez2(w) = w2. Thus:
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Remark 1. When information has no decision-making value, discomfort from information is
captured by the following expression and is increasing in information accuracy:
u(E (w))−
£
1
2u(Ez1 (w)) +
1
2u(Ez2 (w))
¤
(4.1)
Expression (4.1) will be extended to the case where the action is available in the next
subsection.
Let’s now consider the function U(q;w1, w2) in the two extreme cases: the uninformative and
the fully informative signal. From (3.5), when the signal is uninformative anticipatory utility is:
U(12 ;w1, w2) = u
µ
w1 + w2
2
− 14(w1 − w2)
2
¶
(4.2)
Here there is no information gathering and, therefore, no discomfort from information. However
the expected physical loss is maximal. Obviously physical costs are increasing in the diﬀerence
between the two outcomes w1 and w2.
On the contrary, when the signal is fully informative anticipatory utility is:
U(1;w1, w2) = 12u (w1) +
1
2u (w2) (4.3)
Here there is no physical loss because the action a is completely accurate. Obviously U(1;w1, w2)
is lower (or discomfort from information is higher) the more concave the function u(·).
4.1. Non-monotonicity of anticipatory utility
We can now characterize anticipatory utility as a function of information accuracy. Recall that
indirect expected physical utility conditional on the signal si is fi(q;w1, w2)≡E
h
w − (w − a∗i )
2 |si
i
,
i = 1, 2, as expressed in (3.4). Thus, anticipatory utility (3.5) can be rewritten as:
U(q;w1, w2) = 12u (f1(q;w1, w2)) +
1
2u (f2(q;w1, w2))
By deriving with respect to q we find:
∂U(q;w1, w2)
∂q
= 12u
0
1 (f1) f
0
1 (q;w1, w2) +
1
2u
0
2 (f2) f
0
2 (q;w1, w2) (4.4)
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where u0i (·) and f 0i (·) , i = 1, 2, respectively are the first derivative of u(·) with respect to
fi(q;w1, w2) and the first derivative of fi(q;w1, w2) with respect to q. As stated before, u(·) is
increasing and concave and fi(q;w1, w2), i = 1, 2, is convex in q.
Using expression (3.4), the first derivatives of f1(q;w1, w2) and f2(q;w1, w2) with respect to
q respectively are:
f 01(q;w1, w2) = (w1 − w2) [1 + (w1 − w2) (2q − 1)] (4.5)
f 02(q;w1, w2) = (w1 − w2) [−1 + (w1 − w2) (2q − 1)] (4.6)
Note that, when q = 12 , fi(q;w1, w2) = f(
1
2 ;w1, w2) =
w1+w2
2 −
1
4(w1 − w2)2, i = 1, 2, and the
derivative (4.4) is always equal to zero. This is a consequence of the quadratic loss function we
use in DM’s physical utility.
Remark 2. For q = 12 , the first derivative of U(q;w1, w2) is always zero: the uninformative
signal corresponds either to a local maximum or to a local minimum.
Whether the uninformative signal corresponds to a local maximum or to a local minimum
of anticipatory utility depends on the degree of the DM’s aversion to information. This will be
analyzed in Lemma 1.
Now we consider the sign of expression (4.4). From (4.5) f 01(·) is positive. This implies that
the first term in (4.4) is always positive, whereas the second term has the same sign as f 02(·).
Thus, if f2(·) is increasing in q for q ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¤
, anticipatory utility is monotonically increasing
in information accuracy and full information gathering is obviously optimal. When, on the
contrary, f2(·) is decreasing in q, the first and the second term in (4.4) have opposite signs such
that the derivative of anticipatory utility can be either positive or negative. This shows that the
sign of f 02(·) is crucial to assess whether partial or no information gathering are optimal choices.
For an economic intuition, note that an increase in the precision of the signal q always leads
to an increase in f1(q;w1, w2) since, when the signal s1 is observed, (a) the preferred outcome is
more likely and (b) the physical loss due to the inaccurate action decreases, whereas an increase
in the precision of the signal q makes f2(q;w1, w2) either increase or decrease. In fact, when
the signal s2 is observed, (a) the bad outcome is more likely (this corresponds to the term
−1 in (4.6)), (b) the physical loss due to the inaccurate action decreases (this corresponds to
the term +(w1 − w2) (2q − 1) in 4.6). If the negative eﬀect of information on f2(·) prevails
12
(f2(·) decreasing in q), starting from q = 12 , information gathering shifts f2(·) to the left of
f(12 ;w1, w2) =
w1+w2
2 −
1
4(w1 − w2)2 and f1(·) to its right such that the expected physical
utilities f1(·) and f2(·) diverge and some discomfort from information arises. We now define
discomfort from information in the case where information has decision-making value:8
Remark 3. When information has decision-making value, discomfort from information only
arises if f2(·) is decreasing in information accuracy for at least a sub-interval in
£
1
2 , 1
¤
. In such
a sub-interval discomfort from information is positive and equal to:
u(f(12 ;w1, w2))−
£
1
2u(f1(q;w1, w2)) +
1
2u(f2(q;w1, w2))
¤
.
Note that, when some discomfort from information arises, the DM faces a real trade-oﬀ
between the emotional costs and the physical benefits of information. Importantly, only in such
a case anomalous attitudes towards information can occur.
In the next remark we show how the distance between the two outcomes w1−w2 aﬀects the
derivative of f2(q;w1, w2). Starting from q = 12 and slightly increasing information accuracy, first
the negative eﬀect of information on f2(q;w1, w2) prevails over the positive eﬀect independently
of w1 − w2. Then, as information accuracy increases, the derivative of f2(q;w1, w2) strictly
depends on the distance between the two outcomes. In particular, as q increases, the negative
eﬀect due to beliefs getting worse still dominates for w1 − w2 < 1, whereas the positive eﬀect
due to the more eﬃcient action prevails for w1−w2 ≥ 1. Thus, when w1−w2 < 1, f2(q;w1, w2)
is always decreasing in q for q ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¤
.
Remark 4. (i) When w1 − w2 < 1, f
0
2(q;w1, w2) < 0 for q ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¤
. (ii) When w1 − w2 ≥ 1,
f 02(·) ≥ 0 for q = 1 such that ∂U(q;w1,w2)∂q
¯¯¯
q=1
> 0. (iii) When w1 − w2 ≥ 1, f2(q;w1, w2) is first
decreasing and then increasing in q in the interval
£
1
2 , 1
¤
. In particular, the larger w1 − w2, the
lower the subinterval of
£
1
2 , 1
¤
in which f2(·) is decreasing in q.
P roof. See the appendix 6.1
The previous remark shows that, when the cost of an ineﬃcient action is low (w1−w2 < 1),
discomfort from information is always positive and the DM faces the trade-oﬀ between the
8Note that discomfort from information acquisition is always positive and increasing in information accuracy
when no action is available. Whereas, when information has decision-making value, it occurs only if unfavorable
updated beliefs due to bad news have a stronger impact on anticipatory utility than better choices. Moreover, in
that case, discomfort from information is not necessarily increasing in information accuracy.
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emotional costs and physical benefits of information whatever the value of information accuracy.
When, on the contrary, the cost of an ineﬃcient action is high (w1 − w2 ≥ 1), discomfort from
information is positive for low values of information accuracy and disappears for high value of
q. Put diﬀerently, high uncertainty implies that better actions always oﬀset the eﬀect of a bad
signal on beliefs for suﬃciently high information accuracy. Thus, in such a case, information is
always beneficial when q approaches one.
Let’s now consider the second derivative of the function U(q;w1, w2) :
∂2U(q;w1, w2)
∂q2
= 12u
00
1 (f1)
¡
f 01 (·)
¢2
+ 12u
0
1 (f1) f
00
1 (·) + 12u002 (f2)
¡
f 02 (·)
¢2
+ 12u
0
2 (f2) f
00
2 (·) (4.7)
where u00i (·) and f 00i (·) , i = 1, 2, respectively are the second derivative of u(·) with respect to
fi(q;w1, w2) and the second derivative of fi(q;w1, w2) with respect to q. Note that, since u(·)
is increasing in expected physical utility and expected physical utility is convex w.r.t. q, the
second term and the last one of (4.7) are both positive whereas, given our assumption on the
sign of u00i (·), the first and third terms are both negative (whatever the sign of f 02 (·)).9
We now look for conditions such that the uninformative signal corresponds either to a local
maximum or to a local minimum of anticipatory utility. To do so we must define the DM’s
relative aversion to information adapting the concept of relative risk aversion to anticipatory
utility:
Definition 1. Relative aversion to information corresponds toRu(f) = −f(q;w1, w2)u
00(f(q;w1,w2))
u0(f(q;w1,w2)) .
Lemma 1. (i) The uninformative signal is a local minimum if
Ru(f 1
2
) < w1 + w2 −
1
2
(w1 − w2)2 . (4.8)
Inequality (4.8) has economic meaning if its r.h.s. is positive, that is for w1 ∈ (w2+1−
√
4w2 + 1,
w2 + 1 +
√
4w2 + 1).
(ii) The uninformative signal is a local maximum if the opposite of (4.8) holds.
P roof. See the appendix 6.2.
9When the function u(·) is convex or linear, expression (4.7) is always positive. This means that anticipatory
utility is monotonically increasing in q and exhibits a global minimum for q = 1
2 : as we expected, an information-
loving or information-neutral DM will always choose full information gathering.
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The degree of the DM’s relative information aversion is crucial for the non-monotonicity of
anticipatory utility, as we will see.
Now we look for suﬃcient conditions for partial information gathering to be the DM’s pre-
ferred choice. In Appendix 6.3 we show that anticipatory utility is decreasing in the signal
precision for the fully informative signal if inequality (6.2) holds. Two necessary conditions are:
w1 − w2 < 1 and the function u(·) concave enough. In other words, anticipatory utility can
be decreasing in the signal precision for q = 1 only if the inaccurate action is not too costly
and if aversion to information is suﬃciently high. Inequalities (4.8) and (6.2) (the latter in the
appendix) represent suﬃcient conditions such that problem P1 exhibits an internal solution and
anticipatory utility is as in figures 1 and 2:
Remark 5. If the uninformative signal is a minimum of anticipatory utility and anticipatory
utility is decreasing in the signal precision for the fully informative signal, that is if inequalities
(4.8) and (6.2) simultaneously hold, a partially informative signal is the DM’s optimal choice.
Insert figure 1 and 2 about here
Note that condition (4.8) requires that u(·) is not too concave while a necessary condition for
(6.2) is that u(·) must be concave enough. That is, as we expect, an internal solution is possible
when information aversion is neither too high nor too low. In fact, in such a case, even if
the uninformative signal is a minimum of anticipatory utility, for suﬃciently high information
accuracy full information is dominated by partial information (see the discussion of case (a) after
Proposition 1). In Appendix 6.4 our simulations show that, with the power function, inequalities
(4.8) and (6.2) can both be met.
We are now ready to characterize anticipatory utility and to explain why it can be non-
monotone in the signal precision. The shape of U(q;w1, w2) depends both on the DM’s informa-
tion aversion, captured by the concavity of the function u(·), and on the costs of the inaccurate
action, captured by the distance between the two possible outcomes w1 and w2.
Before stating our proposition we recall that f 02(·) < 0 is a necessary condition for anticipatory
utility to be decreasing in information accuracy (see Remark 3). Moreover, the sign of f 02(·)
depends on the distance between w1 and w2 (see Remark 4).
Proposition 1. The shape of anticipatory utility depends on the interaction between the degree
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of the DM’s information aversion and the physical costs due to an inaccurate action. Accord-
ing to the model parameters the DM’s optimal choice can be the fully informative signal, the
uninformative one, or a partially informative signal as summarized by the table below.
q = 12 is a (local) minimum q =
1
2 is a (local) maximum
w1 − w2 < 1
case (a)
either partial or full information
case (c)
either no or full information
w1 − w2 ≥ 1
case (b)
full information
case (d)
either no or full information
(Table 2: optimal choices depending on the parameters.)
In the following the four possible cases are illustrated and discussed.
• Case (a): q = 12 corresponds to a (local) minimum and w1 − w2 < 1. Expected physi-
cal utility f2(·) is decreasing in q for q ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¤
; this implies that the DM experiments
discomfort from information whatever the value of information accuracy. Aversion to in-
formation is (rather) low as well as the damage due to ignorance: the trade-oﬀ between
the emotional costs and physical benefits of information arises for all values of informa-
tion accuracy. Since the uninformative signal is a local minimum, anticipatory utility is
necessarily increasing in q near q = 12 . This means that the physical benefits dominate the
emotional costs of information for low values of information accuracy. However, as infor-
mation accuracy increases, two sub-cases are possible: either the positive term in (4.4)
dominates or the negative one dominates. When the positive term u01 (f1) f 01 (·) prevails,
then q = 12 corresponds to a global minimum and full information is the optimal choice
since anticipatory utility is monotonically increasing in q. The physical benefits always
dominate the emotional costs of information in this sub-case. On the contrary, when the
negative term u02 (f2) f 02 (·) prevails, then anticipatory utility is decreasing in information
accuracy for values of q close to 1: for high values of information accuracy the emotional
costs dominate the physical benefits of information. Here partial information gathering is
the optimal choice. According to Remark 5 this sub-case occurs if both inequalities 4.8
and 6.2 are verified. Interestingly, due to the non-monotonicity of anticipatory utility, in
this sub-case either the fully informative signal dominates the uninformative one, or the
opposite occurs (see figures 1 and 2).
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• Case (b): q = 12 corresponds to a (local) minimum and w1 − w2 ≥ 1. Expected physical
utility f2(·) is decreasing in q only for low values of information accuracy; this implies
that the DM experiments discomfort from information only close to q = 12 . Moreover, as
before, since the uninformative signal is a local minimum, anticipatory utility is necessarily
increasing in q near q = 12 . Thus, the physical benefits dominate the emotional costs of
information for low values of information accuracy. Since f2(·) is increasing in q for high
values of q, anticipatory utility is also necessarily increasing in information accuracy for
high information accuracy. We infer that anticipatory utility is monotonically increasing
in q in the interval
£
1
2 , 1
¤
: the uninformative signal corresponds to a global minimum and
full information gathering is the optimal choice.
• Case (c): q = 12 corresponds to a (local) maximum and w1 − w2 < 1. Expected physical
utility f2(·) is decreasing in q in the whole interval
£
1
2 , 1
¤
; this implies that the DM exper-
iments discomfort from information whatever the value of information accuracy and the
trade-oﬀ between the emotional costs and physical benefits of information always arises.
Since the fully uninformative signal is a local maximum, anticipatory utility is necessarily
decreasing in q near q = 12 . This means that the emotional costs dominate the physical
benefits of information close to q = 12 . As in case (a) before, when information accuracy
increases two sub-cases are possible: either the positive term in (4.4) dominates or the
negative one dominates. When the negative term u02 (f2) f 02 (·) prevails, then anticipatory
utility is monotonically decreasing in information accuracy for q ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¤
; in such a sub-
case the emotional costs always dominate the physical benefits of information and q = 12
corresponds to a global maximum. On the contrary, when the positive term u01 (f1) f 01 (·)
prevails, anticipatory utility becomes increasing in information accuracy for values of q near
to 1. In this sub-case the physical benefits dominate the emotional costs of information
for high values of information accuracy and anticipatory utility exhibits a global minimum
for partial information gathering. The preferred choice can be either the uninformative
signal or the fully informative one. Note that this latter result is quite counterintutive: full
information gathering can be the preferred choice even though the cost of the inaccurate
action is low and aversion to information is high. As in the second sub-case in (a), this
depends on the non-monotonicity of anticipatory utility which here necessarily implies a
corner solution.
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• Case (d): q = 12 corresponds to a (local) maximum and w1 − w2 ≥ 1. Since w1 − w2 ≥ 1,
expected physical utility f2(·) is first decreasing and then increasing in q in the interval£
1
2 , 1
¤
. Thus, discomfort from information arises when information accuracy is low but
disappears when information accuracy is high. Given that the fully uninformative sig-
nal is a local maximum, anticipatory utility is decreasing in q near q = 12 . This means
that the emotional costs dominate the physical benefits of information close to q = 12 .
However, as the signal becomes more informative, anticipatory utility necessarily becomes
increasing in information accuracy. As a consequence anticipatory utility exhibits a global
minimum for partial information gathering. The preferred choice can be again either the
fully informative signal or the uninformative one.10
Details concerning simulations of all the possible cases are provided in Appendix 6.4.
Before concluding this section we illustrate how our results complete and extend those of
Kozsegi (2003). Using a linear loss function he shows that (i) the DM always prefers full
information to full ignorance if uncertainty is limited, i.e. if news is suﬃciently ‘small’ and
does not modify the DM’s beliefs very far; (ii) anticipatory utility is monotonically increasing
(or partial information is never optimal) when absolute aversion to information is constant.
With respect to point (i) we show that, when the loss function is quadratic, no-information can
dominate full information even though uncertainty is small (see the first sub-case in (a) above).
With a linear loss function this cannot be the case since, even when uncertainty is close to
zero, linearity imposes a strictly positive (marginal) benefit from accurate actions (or a strictly
positive marginal cost from ignorance). This implies that, for suﬃciently small uncertainty,
discomfort from information becomes irrelevant whereas the benefit from full information does
not, such that full information necessarily dominates full ignorance.11 Again concerning point
(i), since in our model anticipatory utility can be non-monotone when uncertainty is small, even
though full information can dominate no-information, partial information can dominate both of
10Note that, when q = 1
2
is a maximum, whatever the distance between the two outcomes, the preferred signal
is either the fully informative or the uninformative one (see Table 1). However, when w1 − w2 ≥ 1, anticipatory
utility is always first decreasing and then increasing in information accuracy. On the contrary, when w1−w2 < 1,
anticipatory utility can be either first decreasing and then increasing or monotonically decreasing in information
accuracy. The latter sub-case occurs when the emotional costs of information always dominate its physical
benefits.
11 In addition to being continuously diﬀerentiable, a quadratic loss function diﬀers from a linear one (i.e.
−k|wi − a|) in that the cost of ignorance due to imprecise decisions becomes very small and negligible when
uncertainty tends to vanish. We believe that both loss functions may then adequately represent diﬀerent real
world environments and are equally interesting.
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them. With respect to point (ii) we find general conditions based on the level of uncertainty
and on the DM’s relative aversion to information such that anticipatory utility is monotonically
increasing in information accuracy (see the first sub-case in (a) and case (b)). With a quadratic
loss function relative risk aversion is relevant since it determines whether the uninformative
signal is a maximum or a minimum of anticipatory utility, which is crucial for non-monotonicity.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have addressed the issue of acquisition of information by an emotional DM,
that is an agent who fears bad future outcomes. Using a simple and treatable version of the
Psychological Expected Utility model, we showed that the DM’s approach towards information
gathering depends on the interplay between two key elements: the level of information aversion
and the expected damage due to an inaccurate action (which in turn depends on the level of
uncertainty). Anticipatory utility can be non-monotone in information accuracy and, depending
on the parameters, full information, no information or partial information accuracy can be the
preferred choice. More generally, we showed that anticipatory feelings may really lead to less
information gathering than one would expect from fully rational DMs.
While well-known empirical evidence exists concerning complete information-avoidance be-
haviors as for patients and information provided by medical tests (see the papers mentioned in
the introduction), instances in which one can completely ignore or avoid signals are relatively
rare in other real life situations. Even though, in our daily experience, we observe that partial
information gathering is more plausible and frequent than complete information avoidance, em-
pirical evidence for partial information-avoidance behaviors is not easy to obtain. This is why it
may be expedient to look for experimental evidence in the lab, instead. We leave that for future
research.
A recent literature analyzed information transmission in the agency relationship when the
principal experiences anticipatory feelings and a benevolent, privately informed agent takes into
account those feelings (see Caplin and Leahy 2004 and Kozsegi 2006). In Kozsegi (2006) the
agent is ready to lie if this makes the principal feel better. The principal correctly anticipates this
and, as a consequence, credibility problems arise (as sometimes occurs in the patient-physician
relationship12). Information acquisition by the principal from sources other than the agent can
12For a survey on the important change in the analysis of the patient-physician relationship recently introduced
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be introduced into the picture to investigate the role played by endogenous information gathering
in principal-agent communication. We believe that our simple framework could provide a useful
tool for addressing this issue.
6. Appendix
6.1. Proof of Remark 4
(i) From (4.6) it is easy to check that, when w1 − w2 < 1, f 02(·) is negative for q ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¤
. (ii)
This is obvious from (4.6) and (4.4). (iii) When w1 − w2 ≥ 1, f 02(·) < 0 for q = 12 and f 02(·) > 0
for q = 1. Thus, starting from q = 12 , f2(·) is first decreasing and then increasing in q. From
(4.6) it is easy to see that the higher w1 − w2, the shorter the subinterval of
£
1
2 , 1
¤
where f2(·)
is decreasing in q.
6.2. Proof of Lemma 1
(i) When q = 12 , it is easy to see that:
∂2U(q;w1, w2)
∂q2
¯¯¯¯
q=1
2
= 2u0
¡
f(12 ;w1, w2)
¢
+ u00
¡
f(12 ;w1, w2)
¢
where u01 (·) = u02 (·) = u0 (·) , thus:
∂2U(q;w1, w2)
∂q2
¯¯¯¯
q= 1
2
> 0⇔ Ru(f) < 2f(12 ;w1, w2). (6.1)
(ii) This corresponds to the case where ∂
2U(q;w1,w2)
∂q2
¯¯¯
q= 1
2
< 0.
6.3. Anticipatory utility decreasing in the signal precision for q = 1.
Remark 6. Anticipatory utility is decreasing in the signal precision for q = 1 if and only if:
u0 (w1)
u0 (w2)
<
1− (w1 − w2)
1 + (w1 − w2)
(6.2)
Two necessary conditions are w1 − w2 < 1 and u(·) concave enough.
by considering patient emotions, see Barigozzi and Levaggi (2008).
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P roof. When q = 1, it is easy to see that:
∂U(q;w1, w2)
∂q
¯¯¯¯
q=1
=
1
2
³
w1 − w2 + (w1 − w2)2
´
u0 (w1) +
1
2
³
− (w1 − w2) + (w1 − w2)2
´
u0 (w2)
Thus, for q = 1, anticipatory utility is decreasing in the signal precision if:
(1 + (w1 − w2))u0 (w1)− (1− (w1 − w2))u0 (w2) < 0 (6.3)
From (6.3) condition (6.2) can be immediately derived. Moreover (6.3) can be verified only if
w1−w2 < 1 and it implies that u(·) must be concave enough. In fact, inequality (6.2) is verified
only if u01 (w1) is suﬃciently lower than u02 (w2) .
6.4. Simulations
Let’s consider the power function u (x) = x
1−γ
1−γ , with γ re-interpreted as the parameter of constant
relative aversion to information.13 In this paragraph we provide examples of all the possible
results described in Table 2.
• Case (a) Let’s start with the more interesting sub-case: a preference for the partial infor-
mative signal. According to Remark 5, let’s take γ < 2f(12 ;w1, w2). The uninformative
signal is a minimum for w1 ∈ [w2 + 1 −
√
4w2 + 1− 2γ, w2 + 1 +
√
4w2 + 1− 2γ] and
γ < 12 + 2w2. Moreover, for w1 − w2 < 1 the derivative of anticipatory utility in q = 1 is
negative.14 Figures 1 and 2 show anticipatory utility in the interval q ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¤
when u(·) is
the power function and w1 = .55, w2 = .023. It can be seen that for γ = .42 (figure 1) the
uninformative signal dominates the fully informative one, whereas for γ = .4 (figure 2) the
opposite holds. According to intuition, all else being equal, the lower the relative aversion
to information, the closer to 1 the optimal precision of the signal. In Appendix 6.5 we
present the case of total utility (anticipatory utility plus expected physical utility): an
interior solution still exists and it is compatible with higher values of information aversion.
13To the best of our knowledge, no empirical parameter estimates of individual relative information aversion
are available. The estimates of relative risk aversion vary considerably, but values in the 0.5-3 interval are often
referred to.
14Our simulations show that w2 must be suﬃciently close to zero: when this is the case the power function is
concave enough for inequality (6.2) to be satisfied.
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The second sub-case arises when q = 12 corresponds to a global minimum and full infor-
mation is the optimal choice. This occurs, for example, in the case γ = .3, ω1 = .5 and
ω2 = .2.
• Case (b) The uninformative signal corresponds to a global minimum and full information
gathering is the optimal choice. This occurs, for example, when γ = .5, ω1 = 2.5 and
ω2 = .5.
• Case (c) In the first sub-case q = 12 is a global maximum and no information is the optimal
choice. This occurs, for example, when γ = .7, ω1 = .45 and ω2 = .2. In the second sub-
case anticipatory utility is first decreasing and then increasing in information accuracy and
either full information or no information are the preferred choices. When γ = 1.2, ω1 = 1,
ω2 = .3 full information dominates no information whereas when γ = 1.2, ω1 = .99,
ω2 = .2, the opposite occurs.
• Case (d) Anticipatory utility exhibits a global minimum for partial information gathering.
The preferred choice can be either the fully informative signal or the uninformative one.
When γ = 1.1, ω1 = 1.3, ω2 = .05 no information dominates full information whereas
when γ = .8, ω1 = 1.3, ω2 = .05 the opposite occurs.
6.5. The case of total utility
As we mentioned before, using anticipatory utility only instead of total utility (consisting of
anticipatory utility plus expected physical utility) as the DM’s objective involves no loss of
generality. To show that, in this paragraph we obtain suﬃcient conditions such that partial
information is the preferred choice (as in Remark 5) when the DM’s well-being is measured by
total utility. Total utility is15:
Uˆ(q;w1, w2) =
1
2
u
¡
qw1 + (1− q)w2 − q(1− q)(w1 − w2)2
¢
+
1
2
u
¡
(1− q)w1 + qw2 − q(1− q)(w1 − w2)2
¢
+
1
2(w1 − w2)− q(1− q)(w1 −w2)
2
15Note that the optimal action conditional to the signal observed a∗i does not change with respect to the case
where anticipatory utility only is maximized. In fact, here, the DM’s FOC is [u0i (·) + 1] ∂E[w−(w−a)
2|si]
∂ai
= 0.
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Since a convex term has been added to the DM’s objective function, Lemma 1 and Remark 6
(the latter in the appendix) must be slightly modified.
Corollary 1. The uninformative signal is a local minimum of total utility if
Ru(f 1
2
) < w1 + w2 −
1
2
(w1 −w2)2 + ε (6.4)
where ε ≡ 2f(
1
2 ;w1,w2)
u0
³
f( 12 ;w1,w2)
´ .
Note that f(12 ;w1, w2) and ε are positive for w1 ∈ (w2+1−
√
4w2 + 1, w2 +1+
√
4w2 + 1).
The following corollary is the equivalent of Remark 6 in the case of total utility, that is, it derives
the condition such that total utility is decreasing in the signal precision for the fully informative
signal.
Corollary 2. Total utility is decreasing in the signal precision for q = 1 if and only if:
u0 (w1)
u0 (w2)
<
1− (w1 − w2)
1 + (w1 − w2)
− 2 (w1 − w2)
u0 (w2) [1 + (w1 − w2)]
. (6.5)
Finally, the following corollary states suﬃcient conditions for an internal solution in the case
of total utility:
Corollary 3. With total utility, if both the uninformative signal is a minimum of anticipatory
utility and anticipatory utility is decreasing in the signal precision for the fully informative
signal, that is if conditions 6.4 and 6.5 simultaneously hold, a partially informative signal is the
DM’s optimal choice.
Note that, with total utility, it is less likely that the objective function is decreasing in q for
the fully informative signal, however the condition such that the uninformative signal is a local
minimum is less stringent than before.
To summarize, when the DM maximizes total utility and an internal solution exists, the
latter is compatible with levels of information aversion higher than the values we observed when
anticipatory utility was considered alone. Our simulations show that an internal solution with
total utility can be found, for example when γ = .56, w1 = .53 and w2 = .023.
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Figure 1: anticipatory utility using the power 
function with γ=.42, ω1=.55 and ω2=.023. 
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Figure 2: anticipatory utility using the power 
function with γ=.4, ω1=.55 and ω2=.023. 
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